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Doing the sums on Africa
Small amounts spent on promoting Africa's economy can save billions and make the West more secure
AFRICA'S importance for global security has risen dramatically in
recent years. Africa has served as a staging-post for terrorist attacks
both within the continent and in the Middle East. West Africa's
development prospects have brightened with the discoveries of offshore
oil and gas reserves that could supply perhaps 25% of America's
hydrocarbon imports within a decade, yet the orderly and transparent
development of these reserves is threatened by violence and
instability. Al-Qaeda has reportedly tapped into the illicit diamond
trade in west Africa and has promoted insurgencies across the Sahel
(the border region between desert and savannah). Governments in
countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are co-operating
closely with America to fight these threats. But poverty, hunger and
disease leave the region vulnerable to security and humanitarian
disasters.
In every aspect of Africa's complex plight an ounce of prevention will
be worth a ton of treatment. In recent years America gave a negligible
$4m a year to Ethiopia to boost agricultural productivity, but then
responded with around $500m in emergency food aid in 2003 when the
crops failed. In the 1990s America gave less than $50m a year for
Africa to prevent AIDS, so now will spend $3 billion per year to treat
the disease after it has spread to more than 50m Africans--20m dead and
30m currently infected (see article[1]).
America's security outlays in Africa have shot up by $100m in the new
East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, and could soon dwarf economic
development assistance. America recently committed almost 2,000 troops
in the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti, and
is providing security and intelligence training in the Sahel. But
direct military efforts will not achieve long-term security when
Africa's underlying crises of hunger, disease, poverty and bulging
youth populations remain unaddressed. Indeed, under today's conditions,
a growing American troop presence in Africa could easily provoke a
backlash.
American strategic planners generally recognise the value of economic
development assistance in the aftermath of wars, as in the case of $20
billion that America will spend in Iraq and the $2.3 billion committed
to Afghanistan. Yet when it comes to development assistance to prevent
conflict there is almost no money to be found. America's foreign policy
is strikingly out of kilter, allocating $450 billion per year for the
military and a meagre $15 billion (at most) for development assistance.
Strip out sums for emergencies such as food aid and anti-retroviral
medicines, military assistance, debt service, as well as sums paid to
American consultants rather than to African countries, and total
American development assistance for Africa will be less than $1 billion
this year for more than 700m Africans. What about America's new
Millennium Challenge Account, budgeted this year at $1 billion, but to
be scaled up to $5 billion per year by 2006? This sum is distributed
throughout the developing world, and in any case will be much too small
to address Africa's financing needs for roads, power, clean water,
sanitation, children's health, schools, fertilisers and irrigation, and
other specific investments that could unlock the continent's economic
growth.
A much smarter plan for Africa would save a fortune in the future by
ending Africa's trap of poverty, disease, hunger and violence and
bolstering Africa against the virus of terror. America and its allies
need to appreciate that there are several well-governed African
countries in which investments on a meaningful scale would fuel
regional economic development rather than corruption and misrule.
Specific and well-targeted investments over the coming decade would
provide the foundation for self-sustained growth. And donor countries
need to realise that they are sitting on under-utilised systems that
could deliver that aid effectively.
FIND YOUR PARTNERS
The first step is to identify plausible African partners. In
Afghanistan and Iraq America has not withheld development assistance
pending "good governance". It has ploughed ahead with development
spending even in the midst of extreme violence and even though the
respective American-backed governments in Baghdad and Kabul barely have
a writ of authority that runs beyond (or even within) their respective
capitals. In Africa, the options are vastly better. At an over-arching
level, the new African Union, with its development flagship, the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), has launched an enormously
valuable process of "peer review". So far, 16 African governments have
signed up.
Strong national leadership backed by regional peer review offers a
powerful combination to improve the performance of governments. In west
Africa, at least two strategically positioned countries stand out for
their exceptionally good governance: Ghana and Senegal. Both are
multi-party democracies. Both are led by impressive and popular elected
leaders, Presidents John Agyekum Kufuor and Abdoulaye Wade. Both
countries have an educated cadre that can lead a bold strategy. Both
have acceded to peer review. Yet both are mired in poverty because of
the lack of key infrastructure and because of unabated disease,
especially malaria.
Other impressively governed yet impoverished countries in the region
include Mali and Benin. Nigeria too could turn the corner on
governance. President Olusegun Obasanjo inherited a corrupt governance
mess when he came to power in 1999, but he has worked hard and against
the odds to improve the situation. His new and widely admired finance
minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has recently tabled an impressive
poverty-reduction strategy backed by much more rigorous systems of
public administration and accountability.
In east Africa, there are also several outstanding partners. Effective
leaders in Ethiopia and Uganda have taken two seemingly hopeless
countries and set them on a path of development despite desperate
initial conditions. Meles Zenawi, the prime minister of Ethiopia, has
the most insightful, indeed ingenious, ideas about rural development of
any leader in that country's modern history. President Yoweri Museveni
of Uganda has fashioned the fastest-growing economy in east Africa, and
the only country in all of Africa to have turned the corner on AIDS.
All of this is despite Uganda being landlocked and victimised by an
insurgency in the north backed by Sudan's Islamist forces. Both Messrs
Meles and Museveni have been staunch and unstinting supporters of
America's anti-terrorism efforts, and both have also acceded to African
peer review.
To the east and south, Kenya and Tanzania have democratic and
development-minded governments, but are under extreme stress from
pervasive poverty and disease. Well-governed poor countries farther
south include Botswana and Mozambique, among others. The situation in
Kenya is especially poignant. A bold democratic opposition united to
unseat the deeply entrenched and corrupt ruling party in the 2002
elections. But just as this government came to power, Kenya was hit by
an American State Department travel advisory warning of potential
terrorist threats. Tourism fell off and the government was immediately
on the ropes.
On anybody's list--the World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency
International--a growing and significant number of African countries
has the quality of leadership and governance to achieve economic
development and to fight terrorism. But these countries lack the means.
Consider the dire infrastructure situation in six of these
well-governed countries (see table). They lack the roads, electricity,
health care and teachers needed to break out of poverty. Without this
basic infrastructure, these countries cannot reliably feed themselves,
much less attract investors for long-term growth.
Even Uganda, with its impressive record of economic growth in the
1990s, has experienced an upturn of poverty. Without a multi-lane
highway from Kampala, the capital, to the port of Mombasa in Kenya, and
without a network of roads connecting villages to such a highway, the
economy is trapped in a straitjacket.
NEEDS TO KNOW
The first step to help these countries is a detailed "needs assessment"
of the kind that the UN and World Bank carried out last summer for Iraq
at America's request. The assessment in Iraq was a joint product of the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and about a dozen
specialised UN agencies. These agencies identified Iraq's
infrastructure-investment needs on a sector-by-sector basis. The
results showed that Iraq would need around $36 billion over four years
for roads, power, water and other priorities. Another $20 billion was
needed for targeted spending in "softer" areas like human rights and
culture. The total assessment therefore came to $56 billion over four
years. America has so far pledged around $20 billion of that. In the
case of Afghanistan, a similar exercise in April identified $27.5
billion in investment needs over the next seven years, and the plan was
backed by pledges of $8.2 billion during the coming three years.
This kind of needs assessment has never been done for Africa. In recent
years, African countries have been told by the rich world simply to
"live within their means", however meagre those means might be. The IMF
and World Bank have had to deliver this painful donor message. "Belt
tightening" for people who cannot afford belts became the order of the
day. The professional staffs of the Bretton Woods institutions know
full well that their programmes lack adequate donor financing. But
since these agencies are run by the same donor governments that are
withholding adequate aid, deep frustrations are rarely expressed in
public.
As special adviser to the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, I asked my
colleagues in the Millennium Project to undertake a needs assessment in
order to assay what a more detailed study might show. Our much smaller
team undertook a process very similar to the multi-agency study for
Iraq, looking sector by sector at the gaps in infrastructure,
social-service provision and human resources, and the costs of filling
them in relatively well-governed countries. With only a small portion
of what America is now spending on military and reconstruction outlays
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be possible to enable hundreds of
millions of people to break out of poverty. The average annual
financing needs for the period 2005 to 2015 are roughly as follows.
Basic infrastructure--roads, investments in soil health, water
harvesting for crops, drinking water and sanitation, modern cooking
fuels, electricity--would cost around $45 per person per year between
now and 2015 (using an average of the per-capita costs identified for
Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda). Basic health care--for control of malaria,
AIDS, TB, childhood diseases, safe childbirth, nutrition and family
planning--would be another $30. Upgrading primary and secondary
education would add another $15 per person per year. Other
high-priority items would add roughly another $10, bringing the total
needed investments to around $100 per person per year.
Some of these needs are, of course, covered by domestic budgets, while
a small part comes from the out-of-pocket spending of the extremely
poor. In total, domestic outlays might cover as much as $40 per person
per year, if these poor countries push hard (but not punitively hard)
on mobilising local resources. The remaining $60 gap would require
international help. These countries already receive around $10 per
person per year in aid that is directed at these priorities (additional
aid is directed at other purposes). The unmet need is therefore around
$50 per person per year. Applying these results to six
countries--Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda--with a
combined population of 180m, this amounts to only $9 billion per year
in addition to current aid flows, far less than what was targeted for
Iraq alone with its 24m people.
BEACONS OF STABILITY
Could this money be well absorbed? The answer is a decisive "yes". In
the six countries, the governments are stable. Bridges, pipelines and
power pylons are not being blown up each day. All six countries have
already prepared detailed, often ingenious, plans for scaling up their
investments in the key infrastructure sectors. Ghana has its Ghana
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), Ethiopia its Sustainable Development
and Poverty Reduction Programme, and so forth. Indeed, these plans
reveal a powerful and poignant truth.
Ever since the UN Millennium Assembly in September 2000, the low-income
countries were told to "scale up" their ambitions in order to meet the
poverty-reduction targets summarised in the Millennium Development
Goals. They were told to make plans for Education for All (EFA), to
Roll Back Malaria (RBM), to treat AIDS patients on the scale of 3-by-5
(3m patients in poor countries on anti-retroviral treatment by the end
of 2005, covering half of all those who would need such treatment), and
so forth. The well-governed countries took these initiatives seriously,
making detailed plans and submitting them to the donors. But the donors
got sidetracked by the September 11th attacks. Africa's plans are on
the table, but the financing is not.
Ghana's GPRS, to name just one example, brilliantly identified the
sources of rural poverty. It systematically laid out the case for a
five-year investment programme, identifying regional needs and
timetables for filling them. It produced, in short, a first-rate
analytical effort. But the donors said that it was "unrealistic"--not
in terms of Ghana's needs, potential, goals, or plans, but in terms of
what the donors were prepared to fund. The GPRS went through four
drafts as it was beaten down to "realism" by the donors. In
consequence, the plan addresses only a fraction of the country's real
needs.
With strategic and well-governed countries identified, with plans of
action in place, and with relatively modest financing needs, the last
remaining step is to set in motion a process in which the elements are
combined. Such a process is surprisingly close at hand, if America can
rouse itself even briefly from its election-year and Middle East
preoccupations. The key lies in a multilateral approach to helping
Africa, and America is the biggest missing element for greater
multilateral assistance.
The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank is
the right focal point for revamping and expanding the aid flows. IDA
provides the most successful form of development assistance in the
world today, and it can be made even better. It does five important
things. First, it provides the world's single largest flow of low-cost
development assistance to poor countries, though not enough of it and
not at low enough cost. IDA currently makes commitments of around $8
billion per year, of which 80% is low-interest long-term loans and the
remainder outright grants. Second, it directs its outlays towards the
priorities identified by the recipient countries.
Third, IDA harmonises donor resources. Typically, the 22 rich-country
donors torment recipient governments by insisting on separate aid
projects that allow each donor to "show the flag". In the case of IDA,
however, the donor governments agree, wisely, to pool their resources
into a single basket that can back the specific strategy of the
recipient country. Fourth, IDA commits its resources over a three-year
time horizon rather than a one-year donor budget cycle typical of
bilateral aid. Fifth, it aims to base its allocations on good
performance, using indicators for governance and economic management.
BIGGER IS BETTER
Still, IDA needs to be strengthened in four ways for it to play a
breakthrough role in Africa. Most important by far, instead of $8
billion, IDA's annual programmes should be up to $25 billion, with
around half of that going to Africa. Second, IDA needs to make grants
rather than loans to the poorest recipients, which would include almost
all of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The American government
called for grants rather than loans to finance Iraq's recovery so as
not to encumber future Iraqi generations, and the same principle
applies even more emphatically for impoverished Africa. Third, IDA
should work with the aid recipients on strategies that have a time
horizon long enough to carry them from today to 2015 when they are
supposed to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Fourth, IDA can and
should focus even more on measurable, monitorable and proven
interventions--roads, soil nutrients, anti-malaria bednets, to name a
few--which in combination enable a country to break free of poverty.
In fact, the timing for introducing properly ambitious programmes could
not be better. The next three-year round of IDA financing (IDA-14,
covering fiscal years 2006-08) is currently under negotiation among
donors. The African Union's peer-review mechanism is getting under way.
Next year, Britain hosts the G8 Summit, and Tony Blair's government has
made clear that a doubling of development assistance will be at the
core of the agenda. Mr Blair's Africa Commission is due to report in
spring 2005. And in September 2005, the world's leaders will gather at
the UN to review progress in the five years since the Millennium
Assembly. Will they still be enmeshed in bitter controversy over a
highly contested war? Or will they say with confidence that
well-governed developing countries will finally find a partnership with
their rich counterparts to help the world escape from violence, terror,
disease and extreme poverty?
Jeffrey Sachs is the director of the Earth Institute at Columbia
University in New York and special adviser to UN secretary general,
Kofi Annan, on the Millennium Development Goals
May 20th 2004

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